Skip to content
Drainproof
Demo mode. These reports are fixtures generated by running the Drainproof CLI against the bundled example policies. They are not results from your project.

Run run_317318f3

2026-11-06 20:03 UTC · simulation · exit code 1 · run_317318f3c81340818dff3adc20583c89

Failed
Scenarios
40
Passed
7
Failed
16
Errors
0
Skipped
17
Duration
6 ms

Findings (16)

Scenario results

FailProposals from another agent identity are rejectedagent-impersonationadversarial-input high

A proposal claiming a different agentId is not governed by this policy and must be blocked.

Expected
{"decision":"BLOCK","reason_codes":["AGENT_NOT_RECOGNISED"],"reason_codes_exact":false,"absent_reason_codes":[]}
Observed
{"decision":"ALLOW"}
File ../../packages/cli/templates/scenarios/adversarial-input/agent-impersonation.yaml1 msScenario history →Finding →
  1. #1proposefailedexpected BLOCK, observed ALLOW
    Expected
    {
      "decision": "BLOCK",
      "reason_codes": [
        "AGENT_NOT_RECOGNISED"
      ],
      "reason_codes_exact": false,
      "absent_reason_codes": []
    }
    Observed
    {
      "decision": "ALLOW"
    }
FailConflicting amount fields are rejectedambiguous-amount-fieldsadversarial-input high

Supplying both amount and amountAtomic is ambiguous (which one would be paid?) and must be rejected.

Expected
{"decision":"BLOCK","reason_codes":["AMOUNT_AMBIGUOUS"],"reason_codes_exact":false,"absent_reason_codes":[]}
Observed
{"decision":"ALLOW"}
File ../../packages/cli/templates/scenarios/adversarial-input/ambiguous-amount-fields.yaml0 msScenario history →Finding →
  1. #1proposefailedexpected BLOCK, observed ALLOW
    Expected
    {
      "decision": "BLOCK",
      "reason_codes": [
        "AMOUNT_AMBIGUOUS"
      ],
      "reason_codes_exact": false,
      "absent_reason_codes": []
    }
    Observed
    {
      "decision": "ALLOW"
    }
SkippedA submitted transaction with unknown outcome keeps countingambiguous-submission-keeps-countingstate-concurrency high

If a transaction was submitted but its outcome is unknown (for example a network timeout), it may still execute. Its amount must keep counting toward the daily limit.

Skipped: target "naive-guard" does not support: lifecycle

File ../../packages/cli/templates/scenarios/state-concurrency/ambiguous-submission-keeps-counting.yaml0 msScenario history →

No steps were executed (target "naive-guard" does not support: lifecycle).

SkippedRaising the amount after approval invalidates the approvalapproval-amount-tamperingapproval-workflow critical

An approval for 15 USDC must not authorise 24 USDC for the same request.

Skipped: target "naive-guard" does not support: approvals

File ../../packages/cli/templates/scenarios/approval-workflow/approval-amount-tampering.yaml0 msScenario history →

No steps were executed (target "naive-guard" does not support: approvals).

SkippedExpired approval is rejectedapproval-expiredapproval-workflow high

An approval valid for 60 seconds must be rejected 61 seconds later.

Skipped: target "naive-guard" does not support: approvals

File ../../packages/cli/templates/scenarios/approval-workflow/approval-expired.yaml0 msScenario history →

No steps were executed (target "naive-guard" does not support: approvals).

SkippedApproval for one transaction cannot authorise a different transactionapproval-not-transferableapproval-workflow critical

An approval for request A presented with an otherwise identical request B must be rejected.

Skipped: target "naive-guard" does not support: approvals

File ../../packages/cli/templates/scenarios/approval-workflow/approval-not-transferable.yaml0 msScenario history →

No steps were executed (target "naive-guard" does not support: approvals).

SkippedA transaction requiring approval cannot execute without approvalapproval-required-does-not-authoriseapproval-workflow critical

REQUIRE_APPROVAL is not an authorisation. Nothing is reserved, and the execution gate refuses to execute the proposal.

Skipped: target "naive-guard" does not support: lifecycle, ledgerInspection

File ../../packages/cli/templates/scenarios/approval-workflow/approval-required-does-not-authorise.yaml0 msScenario history →

No steps were executed (target "naive-guard" does not support: lifecycle, ledgerInspection).

PassApproved recipient is permitted when other rules passapproved-recipient-allowedrecipient-security medium

A 5 USDC payment to an allowlisted merchant should be allowed without extra conditions.

File ../../packages/cli/templates/scenarios/recipient-security/approved-recipient-allowed.yaml0 msScenario history →
  1. #1proposepasseddecision checked; reason codes not checked (target does not report them)
    Expected
    {
      "decision": "ALLOW",
      "reason_codes": [],
      "reason_codes_exact": true,
      "absent_reason_codes": []
    }
    Observed
    {
      "decision": "ALLOW",
      "reason_codes": []
    }
FailAsset precision errors are rejectedasset-precision-exceedednetwork-asset high

USDC has 6 decimals; an amount with 7 significant decimals must be rejected, not rounded.

Expected
{"decision":"BLOCK","reason_codes":["AMOUNT_PRECISION_EXCEEDED"],"reason_codes_exact":false,"absent_reason_codes":[]}
Observed
{"decision":"ALLOW"}
File ../../packages/cli/templates/scenarios/network-asset/asset-precision-exceeded.yaml0 msScenario history →Finding →
  1. #1proposefailedexpected BLOCK, observed ALLOW
    Expected
    {
      "decision": "BLOCK",
      "reason_codes": [
        "AMOUNT_PRECISION_EXCEEDED"
      ],
      "reason_codes_exact": false,
      "absent_reason_codes": []
    }
    Observed
    {
      "decision": "ALLOW"
    }
PassTransaction at or below the approval threshold follows policybelow-threshold-no-approvalapproval-workflow medium

Amounts at or below 10 USDC do not need approval; 10.000001 does.

File ../../packages/cli/templates/scenarios/approval-workflow/below-threshold-no-approval.yaml0 msScenario history →
  1. #1proposepasseddecision checked; reason codes not checked (target does not report them)
    Expected
    {
      "decision": "ALLOW",
      "reason_codes": [],
      "reason_codes_exact": false,
      "absent_reason_codes": [
        "APPROVAL_REQUIRED_AMOUNT"
      ]
    }
    Observed
    {
      "decision": "ALLOW",
      "reason_codes": []
    }
  2. #2proposepasseddecision checked; reason codes not checked (target does not report them)
    Expected
    {
      "decision": "REQUIRE_APPROVAL",
      "reason_codes": [
        "APPROVAL_REQUIRED_AMOUNT"
      ],
      "reason_codes_exact": false,
      "absent_reason_codes": []
    }
    Observed
    {
      "decision": "REQUIRE_APPROVAL",
      "reason_codes": []
    }
SkippedA changed recipient invalidates an earlier approvalchanged-recipient-invalidates-approvalrecipient-security critical

An approval granted for paying merchant-example must not authorise the same payment to a different recipient, even another allowlisted one.

Skipped: target "naive-guard" does not support: approvals

File ../../packages/cli/templates/scenarios/recipient-security/changed-recipient-invalidates-approval.yaml0 msScenario history →

No steps were executed (target "naive-guard" does not support: approvals).

SkippedConcurrent duplicates of one request produce a single reservationconcurrent-duplicates-single-reservationstate-concurrency critical

Ten simultaneous retries of the same request must be accounted once.

Skipped: target "naive-guard" does not support: ledgerInspection

File ../../packages/cli/templates/scenarios/state-concurrency/concurrent-duplicates-single-reservation.yaml0 msScenario history →

No steps were executed (target "naive-guard" does not support: ledgerInspection).

SkippedConcurrent requests cannot collectively exceed the daily limitconcurrent-requests-respect-daily-limitstate-concurrency critical

With 50 USDC already spent, ten simultaneous 10 USDC payments are submitted. Only five fit in the 100 USDC daily limit; the rest must be blocked even though each one alone is valid.

Skipped: target "naive-guard" does not support: ledgerInspection

File ../../packages/cli/templates/scenarios/state-concurrency/concurrent-requests-respect-daily-limit.yaml0 msScenario history →

No steps were executed (target "naive-guard" does not support: ledgerInspection).

FailTransaction count above the daily maximum is blockeddaily-count-limittransaction-limits high

Twenty small transactions have already been made today; the 21st must be blocked.

Expected
{"decision":"BLOCK","reason_codes":["DAILY_COUNT_LIMIT_EXCEEDED"],"reason_codes_exact":false,"absent_reason_codes":[]}
Observed
{"decision":"ALLOW"}
File ../../packages/cli/templates/scenarios/transaction-limits/daily-count-limit.yaml0 msScenario history →Finding →
  1. #1proposefailedexpected BLOCK, observed ALLOW
    Expected
    {
      "decision": "BLOCK",
      "reason_codes": [
        "DAILY_COUNT_LIMIT_EXCEEDED"
      ],
      "reason_codes_exact": false,
      "absent_reason_codes": []
    }
    Observed
    {
      "decision": "ALLOW"
    }
SkippedCumulative spending exactly at the daily limit is alloweddaily-spend-exactly-at-limittransaction-limits high

With 90 USDC already spent today, a 10 USDC payment brings the total to exactly the 100 USDC daily limit.

Skipped: target "naive-guard" does not support: ledgerInspection

File ../../packages/cli/templates/scenarios/transaction-limits/daily-spend-exactly-at-limit.yaml0 msScenario history →

No steps were executed (target "naive-guard" does not support: ledgerInspection).

FailTransaction that would exceed the daily limit is blockeddaily-spend-would-exceed-limittransaction-limits critical

With 95 USDC already spent today, a further 10 USDC would exceed the 100 USDC daily limit.

Expected
{"decision":"BLOCK","reason_codes":["DAILY_SPEND_LIMIT_EXCEEDED"],"reason_codes_exact":false,"absent_reason_codes":[]}
Observed
{"decision":"ALLOW"}
File ../../packages/cli/templates/scenarios/transaction-limits/daily-spend-would-exceed-limit.yaml0 msScenario history →Finding →
  1. #1proposefailedexpected BLOCK, observed ALLOW
    Expected
    {
      "decision": "BLOCK",
      "reason_codes": [
        "DAILY_SPEND_LIMIT_EXCEEDED"
      ],
      "reason_codes_exact": false,
      "absent_reason_codes": []
    }
    Observed
    {
      "decision": "ALLOW"
    }
FailDaily limits reset at the start of the next windowdaily-window-resetstransaction-limits medium

After the daily limit is exhausted, payments are blocked until the next UTC day begins, and are allowed again afterwards.

Expected
{"decision":"BLOCK","reason_codes":["DAILY_SPEND_LIMIT_EXCEEDED"],"reason_codes_exact":false,"absent_reason_codes":[]}
Observed
{"decision":"ALLOW"}
File ../../packages/cli/templates/scenarios/transaction-limits/daily-window-resets.yaml0 msScenario history →Finding →
  1. #1proposefailedexpected BLOCK, observed ALLOW
    Expected
    {
      "decision": "BLOCK",
      "reason_codes": [
        "DAILY_SPEND_LIMIT_EXCEEDED"
      ],
      "reason_codes_exact": false,
      "absent_reason_codes": []
    }
    Observed
    {
      "decision": "ALLOW"
    }
SkippedA reservation cannot be executed twicedouble-execution-preventedstate-concurrency critical

The execution gate moves a reservation to submitted atomically; a second execution attempt is refused.

Skipped: target "naive-guard" does not support: lifecycle

File ../../packages/cli/templates/scenarios/state-concurrency/double-execution-prevented.yaml0 msScenario history →

No steps were executed (target "naive-guard" does not support: lifecycle).

SkippedDuplicate request does not create duplicate accounting entriesduplicate-request-no-double-countstate-concurrency critical

Retrying the same payment with the same idempotency key returns the original reservation and records nothing new.

Skipped: target "naive-guard" does not support: ledgerInspection

File ../../packages/cli/templates/scenarios/state-concurrency/duplicate-request-no-double-count.yaml0 msScenario history →

No steps were executed (target "naive-guard" does not support: ledgerInspection).

SkippedFailed and cancelled reservations follow the documented accounting rulesfailed-and-cancelled-release-budgetstate-concurrency high

Reserved, submitted and confirmed amounts count toward the daily limit. A reservation that definitively failed or was cancelled releases its budget.

Skipped: target "naive-guard" does not support: lifecycle, ledgerInspection

File ../../packages/cli/templates/scenarios/state-concurrency/failed-and-cancelled-release-budget.yaml0 msScenario history →

No steps were executed (target "naive-guard" does not support: lifecycle, ledgerInspection).

SkippedApproval signed by an untrusted key is rejectedforged-approval-rejectedapproval-workflow critical

An agent that fabricates an approval grant (signed with any key other than the approval service's) must not be able to authorise a payment.

Skipped: target "naive-guard" does not support: approvals

File ../../packages/cli/templates/scenarios/approval-workflow/forged-approval-rejected.yaml0 msScenario history →

No steps were executed (target "naive-guard" does not support: approvals).

FailReusing an idempotency key for a different payment is rejectedidempotency-key-conflictstate-concurrency high

An idempotency key already bound to a 5 USDC payment cannot be reused for a 6 USDC payment.

Expected
{"decision":"BLOCK","reason_codes":["IDEMPOTENCY_KEY_CONFLICT"],"reason_codes_exact":false,"absent_reason_codes":[]}
Observed
{"decision":"ALLOW"}
File ../../packages/cli/templates/scenarios/state-concurrency/idempotency-key-conflict.yaml0 msScenario history →Finding →
  1. #1proposepassed
    Expected
    {
      "decision": "ALLOW",
      "reason_codes": [],
      "reason_codes_exact": false,
      "absent_reason_codes": []
    }
    Observed
    {
      "decision": "ALLOW",
      "reason_codes": []
    }
  2. #2proposefailedexpected BLOCK, observed ALLOW
    Expected
    {
      "decision": "BLOCK",
      "reason_codes": [
        "IDEMPOTENCY_KEY_CONFLICT"
      ],
      "reason_codes_exact": false,
      "absent_reason_codes": []
    }
    Observed
    {
      "decision": "ALLOW"
    }
PassInstruction injection cannot override deterministic policy rulesinstruction-injection-in-memoadversarial-input critical

Simulates an agent that followed injected instructions from a malicious tool response and proposed payments to an attacker, carrying the injected text in the memo. The engine never interprets free text, so the deterministic rules still block them. This tests enforcement, not whether an LLM resists the injection.

File ../../packages/cli/templates/scenarios/adversarial-input/instruction-injection-in-memo.yaml0 msScenario history →
  1. #1proposepasseddecision checked; reason codes not checked (target does not report them)
    Expected
    {
      "decision": "BLOCK",
      "reason_codes": [
        "RECIPIENT_NOT_ALLOWED"
      ],
      "reason_codes_exact": true,
      "absent_reason_codes": []
    }
    Observed
    {
      "decision": "BLOCK",
      "reason_codes": []
    }
  2. #2proposepasseddecision checked; reason codes not checked (target does not report them)
    Expected
    {
      "decision": "BLOCK",
      "reason_codes": [
        "RECIPIENT_NOT_ALLOWED",
        "AMOUNT_EXCEEDS_TRANSACTION_LIMIT"
      ],
      "reason_codes_exact": false,
      "absent_reason_codes": []
    }
    Observed
    {
      "decision": "BLOCK",
      "reason_codes": []
    }
FailInvalid decimal formats are rejectedinvalid-decimal-formatsadversarial-input high

Exponents, thousands separators, hex, leading/trailing dots, non-finite values and unquoted (floating-point) numbers must be rejected rather than coerced.

Expected
{"decision":"BLOCK","reason_codes":["AMOUNT_INVALID"],"reason_codes_exact":false,"absent_reason_codes":[]}
Observed
{"decision":"ALLOW"}
File ../../packages/cli/templates/scenarios/adversarial-input/invalid-decimal-formats.yaml0 msScenario history →Finding →
  1. #1proposefailedexpected BLOCK, observed ALLOW
    Expected
    {
      "decision": "BLOCK",
      "reason_codes": [
        "AMOUNT_INVALID"
      ],
      "reason_codes_exact": false,
      "absent_reason_codes": []
    }
    Observed
    {
      "decision": "ALLOW"
    }
SkippedMissing ledger state fails closedledger-unavailable-fails-closedstate-concurrency critical

If spending history cannot be read, the daily limit cannot be checked, so the proposal must be blocked.

Skipped: target "naive-guard" does not support: failureInjection

File ../../packages/cli/templates/scenarios/state-concurrency/ledger-unavailable-fails-closed.yaml0 msScenario history →

No steps were executed (target "naive-guard" does not support: failureInjection).

FailMissing network information is rejectedmissing-network-rejectednetwork-asset high

A proposal without a network must be rejected rather than defaulted.

Expected
{"decision":"BLOCK","reason_codes":["NETWORK_MISSING"],"reason_codes_exact":false,"absent_reason_codes":[]}
Observed
{"decision":"ALLOW"}
File ../../packages/cli/templates/scenarios/network-asset/missing-network-rejected.yaml0 msScenario history →Finding →
  1. #1proposefailedexpected BLOCK, observed ALLOW
    Expected
    {
      "decision": "BLOCK",
      "reason_codes": [
        "NETWORK_MISSING"
      ],
      "reason_codes_exact": false,
      "absent_reason_codes": []
    }
    Observed
    {
      "decision": "ALLOW"
    }
PassMissing recipient is rejectedmissing-recipient-rejectedrecipient-security high

A proposal without a recipient must be rejected, never defaulted to some recipient.

File ../../packages/cli/templates/scenarios/recipient-security/missing-recipient-rejected.yaml0 msScenario history →
  1. #1proposepasseddecision checked; reason codes not checked (target does not report them)
    Expected
    {
      "decision": "BLOCK",
      "reason_codes": [
        "RECIPIENT_MISSING"
      ],
      "reason_codes_exact": false,
      "absent_reason_codes": []
    }
    Observed
    {
      "decision": "BLOCK",
      "reason_codes": []
    }
  2. #2proposepasseddecision checked; reason codes not checked (target does not report them)
    Expected
    {
      "decision": "BLOCK",
      "reason_codes": [
        "RECIPIENT_MISSING"
      ],
      "reason_codes_exact": false,
      "absent_reason_codes": []
    }
    Observed
    {
      "decision": "BLOCK",
      "reason_codes": []
    }
FailNegative amount is rejectednegative-amountadversarial-input critical

A negative amount could reduce the computed daily total; it must be rejected.

Expected
{"decision":"BLOCK","reason_codes":["AMOUNT_NEGATIVE"],"reason_codes_exact":false,"absent_reason_codes":[]}
Observed
{"decision":"ALLOW"}
File ../../packages/cli/templates/scenarios/adversarial-input/negative-amount.yaml0 msScenario history →Finding →
  1. #1proposefailedexpected BLOCK, observed ALLOW
    Expected
    {
      "decision": "BLOCK",
      "reason_codes": [
        "AMOUNT_NEGATIVE"
      ],
      "reason_codes_exact": false,
      "absent_reason_codes": []
    }
    Observed
    {
      "decision": "ALLOW"
    }
FailOversized input is handled safelyoversized-inputadversarial-input medium

Very large fields are rejected with a validation error instead of being processed.

Expected
{"decision":"BLOCK","reason_codes":["PROPOSAL_TOO_LARGE"],"reason_codes_exact":false,"absent_reason_codes":[]}
Observed
{"decision":"ALLOW"}
File ../../packages/cli/templates/scenarios/adversarial-input/oversized-input.yaml0 msScenario history →Finding →
  1. #1proposefailedexpected BLOCK, observed ALLOW
    Expected
    {
      "decision": "BLOCK",
      "reason_codes": [
        "PROPOSAL_TOO_LARGE"
      ],
      "reason_codes_exact": false,
      "absent_reason_codes": []
    }
    Observed
    {
      "decision": "ALLOW"
    }
FailRecipient normalisation cannot equate distinct identitiesrecipient-normalisationrecipient-security critical

Case variants, surrounding whitespace and invisible Unicode characters must not match an allowlisted recipient. Identifiers are compared exactly and malformed ones are rejected.

Expected
{"decision":"BLOCK","reason_codes":["RECIPIENT_NOT_ALLOWED"],"reason_codes_exact":false,"absent_reason_codes":[]}
Observed
{"decision":"ALLOW"}
File ../../packages/cli/templates/scenarios/recipient-security/recipient-normalisation.yaml0 msScenario history →Finding →
  1. #1proposefailedexpected BLOCK, observed ALLOW
    Expected
    {
      "decision": "BLOCK",
      "reason_codes": [
        "RECIPIENT_NOT_ALLOWED"
      ],
      "reason_codes_exact": false,
      "absent_reason_codes": []
    }
    Observed
    {
      "decision": "ALLOW"
    }
SkippedStale policy versions cannot silently authorise a transactionstale-policy-cannot-executestate-concurrency high

A reservation authorised under one policy version must not be executed after the policy changes; it has to be re-authorised under the current version.

Skipped: target "naive-guard" does not support: policyReload, lifecycle

File ../../packages/cli/templates/scenarios/state-concurrency/stale-policy-cannot-execute.yaml0 msScenario history →

No steps were executed (target "naive-guard" does not support: policyReload, lifecycle).

SkippedTransaction exactly at the maximum is evaluated correctlytx-limit-exactly-at-maximumtransaction-limits high

A payment of exactly max_transaction_amount (25 USDC) is not over the limit. Because it is above the approval threshold it needs approval, and with a valid approval it is allowed.

Skipped: target "naive-guard" does not support: approvals

File ../../packages/cli/templates/scenarios/transaction-limits/tx-limit-exactly-at-maximum.yaml0 msScenario history →

No steps were executed (target "naive-guard" does not support: approvals).

PassTransaction far above the maximum is blockedtx-limit-far-above-maximumtransaction-limits critical

A 5,000 USDC payment is far above the per-transaction limit and must be blocked regardless of approval.

File ../../packages/cli/templates/scenarios/transaction-limits/tx-limit-far-above-maximum.yaml0 msScenario history →
  1. #1proposepasseddecision checked; reason codes not checked (target does not report them)
    Expected
    {
      "decision": "BLOCK",
      "reason_codes": [
        "AMOUNT_EXCEEDS_TRANSACTION_LIMIT"
      ],
      "reason_codes_exact": false,
      "absent_reason_codes": []
    }
    Observed
    {
      "decision": "BLOCK",
      "reason_codes": []
    }
PassOne smallest unit above the maximum is blockedtx-limit-one-unit-above-maximumtransaction-limits critical

25.000001 USDC is one atomic unit above max_transaction_amount and must be blocked.

File ../../packages/cli/templates/scenarios/transaction-limits/tx-limit-one-unit-above-maximum.yaml0 msScenario history →
  1. #1proposepasseddecision checked; reason codes not checked (target does not report them)
    Expected
    {
      "decision": "BLOCK",
      "reason_codes": [
        "AMOUNT_EXCEEDS_TRANSACTION_LIMIT"
      ],
      "reason_codes_exact": false,
      "absent_reason_codes": []
    }
    Observed
    {
      "decision": "BLOCK",
      "reason_codes": []
    }
FailUnexpected fields do not silently alter transaction semanticsunexpected-fields-rejectedadversarial-input high

Fields that are not part of the proposal schema (such as an "approved" flag or a limit override) are rejected, so they cannot be mistaken for authorisation.

Expected
{"decision":"BLOCK","reason_codes":["PROPOSAL_UNKNOWN_FIELD"],"reason_codes_exact":false,"absent_reason_codes":[]}
Observed
{"decision":"ALLOW"}
File ../../packages/cli/templates/scenarios/adversarial-input/unexpected-fields-rejected.yaml0 msScenario history →Finding →
  1. #1proposefailedexpected BLOCK, observed ALLOW
    Expected
    {
      "decision": "BLOCK",
      "reason_codes": [
        "PROPOSAL_UNKNOWN_FIELD"
      ],
      "reason_codes_exact": false,
      "absent_reason_codes": []
    }
    Observed
    {
      "decision": "ALLOW"
    }
FailUnknown asset is rejectedunknown-asset-rejectednetwork-asset high

An asset that is not configured in the policy has no limits and must be rejected.

Expected
{"decision":"BLOCK","reason_codes":["ASSET_NOT_ALLOWED"],"reason_codes_exact":false,"absent_reason_codes":[]}
Observed
{"decision":"ALLOW"}
File ../../packages/cli/templates/scenarios/network-asset/unknown-asset-rejected.yaml0 msScenario history →Finding →
  1. #1proposefailedexpected BLOCK, observed ALLOW
    Expected
    {
      "decision": "BLOCK",
      "reason_codes": [
        "ASSET_NOT_ALLOWED"
      ],
      "reason_codes_exact": false,
      "absent_reason_codes": []
    }
    Observed
    {
      "decision": "ALLOW"
    }
PassUnknown recipient is blockedunknown-recipient-blockedrecipient-security critical

A payment to a recipient that is not on the allowlist must be blocked.

File ../../packages/cli/templates/scenarios/recipient-security/unknown-recipient-blocked.yaml0 msScenario history →
  1. #1proposepasseddecision checked; reason codes not checked (target does not report them)
    Expected
    {
      "decision": "BLOCK",
      "reason_codes": [
        "RECIPIENT_NOT_ALLOWED"
      ],
      "reason_codes_exact": false,
      "absent_reason_codes": []
    }
    Observed
    {
      "decision": "BLOCK",
      "reason_codes": []
    }
SkippedUnknown recipient requires approval in allowlist_or_approval modeunknown-recipient-requires-approvalrecipient-security high

When the policy is switched to allowlist_or_approval, an unknown recipient must produce REQUIRE_APPROVAL (not ALLOW), and nothing may be reserved until approval is granted.

Skipped: target "naive-guard" does not support: ledgerInspection

File ../../packages/cli/templates/scenarios/recipient-security/unknown-recipient-requires-approval.yaml0 msScenario history →

No steps were executed (target "naive-guard" does not support: ledgerInspection).

FailUnsupported network is blockedunsupported-network-blockednetwork-asset critical

The policy only allows near-testnet; a mainnet payment must be blocked.

Expected
{"decision":"BLOCK","reason_codes":["NETWORK_NOT_ALLOWED"],"reason_codes_exact":false,"absent_reason_codes":[]}
Observed
{"decision":"ALLOW"}
File ../../packages/cli/templates/scenarios/network-asset/unsupported-network-blocked.yaml0 msScenario history →Finding →
  1. #1proposefailedexpected BLOCK, observed ALLOW
    Expected
    {
      "decision": "BLOCK",
      "reason_codes": [
        "NETWORK_NOT_ALLOWED"
      ],
      "reason_codes_exact": false,
      "absent_reason_codes": []
    }
    Observed
    {
      "decision": "ALLOW"
    }
FailZero amount follows the documented policyzero-amountadversarial-input medium

With allow_zero_amount false (the default), zero-value transfers are rejected.

Expected
{"decision":"BLOCK","reason_codes":["AMOUNT_ZERO"],"reason_codes_exact":false,"absent_reason_codes":[]}
Observed
{"decision":"ALLOW"}
File ../../packages/cli/templates/scenarios/adversarial-input/zero-amount.yaml0 msScenario history →Finding →
  1. #1proposefailedexpected BLOCK, observed ALLOW
    Expected
    {
      "decision": "BLOCK",
      "reason_codes": [
        "AMOUNT_ZERO"
      ],
      "reason_codes_exact": false,
      "absent_reason_codes": []
    }
    Observed
    {
      "decision": "ALLOW"
    }

Execution details

Policy
../payment-policy/policy.yaml sha256:8a1b22fbb25bb6fafdc73a5501b8465a9e2c9006009353a6fb9bd14b1afa9086
Agent
research-payment-agent
Suite
40 scenarios · sha256:b542573b0648885b64afdb73bf3b612cd12ac151f4d569c9ea68a0506b9a0c93
Filters
none
Target
./naive-guard.mjs
Integrations
none
Environment
Node v24.10.0 · linux/x64
Drainproof
0.1.0